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Midcentury Modern: The Emergence of Stakeholders in
Democratic Practice
KAVI JOSEPH ABRAHAM Durham University, United Kingdom
Since the 1960s, “the stakeholder,” or affected party, has emerged as a novel democratic subject whoseparticipation in varied institutional sites—from universities to government agencies, corporateboardrooms to international organizations—is seen as necessary for the management of complex
problems. However, few specifically attend to the stakeholder as a distinct political subject and consider its
implications for democratic practice. This paper presents a genealogy of the stakeholder, documenting its
appearance in corporate managerialism and US public administration and showing how racial mobil-
ization, rapid technological progress, and the political rationality of systems thinking provided the
conditions of possibility for its emergence. Though orienting democracy around stakeholders permits
opportunities for participation in political life, I argue that this subject is predicated on a circumscribed
form of participatory politics that erodes habits of discovering a common good, erases distinctions between
individuals and corporate bodies, and amplifies the problem of expertise.
INTRODUCTION
D emocracy is a problem. Amid populist mobil-izations, transnational racism, deep economicinequality, and a mistrust of institutions at
home and abroad, political theorists sense a crisis of
democracy (Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Merkel 2014;
Merkel and Gagnon 2016; Vormann and Lammert
2019; Westbrook 2021; cf. McCaffrie and Akram
2014; Urbinati 2019, 18). Such concerns are not
unfounded: recent surveys suggest that popular dissat-
isfaction with democracy is particularly acute in the
United States and generally rising across the globe
(Foa et al. 2020, 9, 19–20). Defenders of democracy
often call for a renewal of participation, but such
proposals for democratic engagement and participation
miss a curious puzzle: the last few decades have seen
increased opportunities for public participation in
diverse domestic and international institutions
(Rosenbluth and Shapiro 2018, 3). Specifically, through
the language of stakeholder inclusion, participatory
appeals issue from corporate boardrooms (Esty and
Ciechanover 2021), city councils (Legacy 2010), federal
agencies (Mueller 2002), and international organiza-
tions (Bäckstrand 2006). Across these varied sites,
individuals and groups are called upon to make their
voices heard not as citizens (or even lobbyists or special
interests) but as “stakeholders.” By bringing affected
parties or stakeholders to the table, public and private
organizations are said to not only develop and imple-
ment effective solutions to complex problems but also
empower people to participate more fully in political
life. And yet such calls for participation have not
correlated with increased satisfaction with or trust in
political institutions. How is it that despite opportun-
ities for “stakeholder” participation, democracy
remains precarious? How have participatory mechan-
isms failed to energize democratic attachments?
I wager that the very concept of the stakeholder is
significant inmaking sense of this curiosity, such that any
diagnosis of democracy’s ills requires a deeper historical
understanding of how we became stakeholders. The
transition from citizens to stakeholders is a significant
one, yet there has been scant attention to it (cf. Bevir
2006; Eagleton-Pierce 2016; Macdonald 2008). In this
paper, I compose a critical genealogy of the stakeholder
as a novel form of political subjectivity that organizes
contemporary democratic practice. I document its
appearance in corporate managerialism and US public
administration, showing how racial mobilization, rapid
technological progress, and the rationality of open sys-
tems thinking provided the conditions of possibility for
its emergence. I find that the stakeholder has emerged as
a subject of democratic governance whose participation
is seen as necessary to the management of complex
problems. Though oriented to participation, deliber-
ation, and collaboration, the stakeholder, I argue, is
predicated on a circumscribed form of participatory
politics that erodes habits of discovering a common
good, erases distinctions between individuals and cor-
porate bodies, and amplifies the problem of expertise.
I make this argument in four parts. First, I outline
the methodological advantages of pursuing a geneal-
ogy of the stakeholder and sketch the political ration-
ality of systems thinking. Second, I turn to plotting the
emergence of the stakeholder in mid-twentieth-cen-
tury business managerial discourse. By examining
managerial texts, I outline a set of material problems
and scientific discourses that make the stakeholder, or
affected party, a new object of managerialism. Third, I
show how the figure of the stakeholder appears in US
government agencies to manage the problem of com-
plexity. It is the convergence of several problematic
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entanglements—including Cold War competition,
urbanization, advanced social welfare policies, rapid
technological growth, and civil rights mobilization—
that pose a problem of complexity for the state.
Through the logic of systems thinking, the stakeholder
is articulated as a primary subject of democratic prac-
tice, one whose identification and participation could
help manage complexity. Fourth, I discuss the impli-
cations of this subject for democratic practice and
governance. Whereas the orientation to stakeholders
resonates with what Kyong-Min Son (2020) calls
“instrumental democracy,” I find a different relation-
ship holding among participation, elitism, and self-
interested instrumentalism. I conclude with a discus-
sion of how this project contributes to contemporary
debates on the role of neoliberalism in the present
crisis of democracy.
SYSTEMS THINKING AS POLITICAL
RATIONALITY
How might one go about documenting the production
of the stakeholder? This kind of genealogical argument
demands a historicity that looks for the discursive
production of the stakeholder in institutional settings
—not only in academic discourse or the canons of
political theory but also in the archives of concrete
programs of government. As argued by others (Bevir
2010; McClanahan 2017; Son 2020; Vázquez-Arroyo
2008), my sense is that factors shaping democratic
erosion have a deep history that extend to the postwar
era. Starting with the subject of the stakeholder, how-
ever, genealogically plotting its emergence in manager-
ialism andUS government agencies, I locate a different
set of problems, techniques, and discourses that trans-
formed democratic practice. To be sure, I am not
advancing a linear history, claiming that a patient
empiricism of midcentury processes will provide us
with the causes of democratic crisis today. Nor is this
work meant to displace dominant accounts in the lit-
erature that rightly identify how liberal or neoliberal
political economy erodes democracy. Genealogy, as
Foucault sketches it in multiple places, refuses to
“restore an unbroken continuity” between past and
present but composes the heterogenous elements, pro-
cesses, and conditions that “gave birth to those things
that continue to exist and have value for us” (Foucault
1984, 81). Rather than read “the past in terms of the
present” (Foucault 1977, 31), rather than establish
efficient causal mechanisms or linear histories, geneal-
ogy is a discontinuous composition of elements that
makes the emergence of something possible. As such, I
seek to recover those discursive and material elements
thatmade possible a novel political subject that remains
important to contemporary democratic practice—the
stakeholder.
Analytically, my genealogy is organized around the
concept of political rationality—or the discursive forms
of political calculation and reasoning from which gov-
ernance practices, rules, norms, and subjects are speci-
fied and intelligibly grounded (Barry, Osborne, and
Rose 1996; Burchell 1993, 269; Dean 1999, 25; Miller
and Rose 1990; Rose 1993, 295). As Wendy Brown
(2015, 116) notes, political rationalities are the condi-
tion of possibility for concrete practices and techniques
of governing, at once organizing them and serving as
their normative basis. They are neither policy para-
digms nor abstract philosophical projects that become
realized in a deterministic manner but a form of polit-
ical reasoning drawn from, elaborated through, and
grounded in scientific knowledge and through which
governance objects, techniques, and subjectivity
become possible (Dean 1999, 25).A political rationality
not only names a discourse that constructs the objects
and techniques of government but also generates novel
subjects, new ways of being in the world. While the
concept typically organizes Foucauldian accounts of
neoliberalism, I use it to conceptualize systems think-
ing. Specifically, my argument is that the production of
the stakeholder as a novel subject of democratic gov-
ernance was made possible by the political rationality
of systems thinking.
Systems Thinking and the Problem of
Complexity
Systems thinking is a transdisciplinary scientific dis-
course that emerged in the middle of the twentieth
century, such that by the 1970s, diverse academic dis-
ciplines were thinking in terms of systems (Heyck 2015,
6–8). From biology to physics, engineering to social
sciences, systems thinking constituted a plastic dis-
course that condensed in different fields, linking
approaches such as cybernetics, family systems psych-
ology, contingency theory, system dynamics, and
futures studies. Systems thinking was not a coherent
paradigm under which scientific disciplines reorganized
themselves. Rather, from the 1940s until Ludwig von
Bertalanffy’s (1968) articulation of “general systems
theory,” it unfolded as an unstructured discourse in
multiple disciplines semiautonomously from one
another (Ackoff 1974a, 12–3; von Bertalanffy 1968,
30–1).
A first cut in grasping systems thinking involves the
distinction between closed and open systems. Though
both closed and open systems thinking seeks to under-
stand phenomena by modeling the holistic interaction
of parts, closed systems thinking does so on the
assumption that connections among parts are
bounded and that they can be reduced to homogenous
quantifiable forms. Closed systems tend to be isolated
from their environment, operate under predictable
conditions, and therefore, are more easily governed
by techniques of command and control. Closed system
thinking is indicative of the changes that swept the
Department of Defense (DoD) under Robert McNa-
mara, Charlie Hitch, and figures from the RAND
corporation (Amadae 2003, 62–4), and it informs
inquiry into midcentury democratic governance. Son
(2020, 105), for instance, names “systems science” as
contributing to the making of “instrumental
democracy,” arguing that it renders democracy as a

























































































































preferences and, therefore, “dispenses with the need
for citizens to determine their collective goals through
public deliberation.” Advancing this position through
a reading of David Easton’s model of political systems
(71–2), Son finds unresolved tensions in Easton’s
notion of “dynamic stability”—or the principle that
posits responsiveness to changing public demands as
necessary for stable political systems (80–2). Son
argues that centralizing tendencies persist under
dynamic stability in that systems science—the kind
operative at the DoD (86–8)—is premised on a dis-
trust for the rational capacities of individuals (84),
requires decision making to be concentrated at the
top (85), and presumes that the character of problems
can be reduced to “homogenous quantitative data”
(88). Thus, for Son, not only is democratic subjectivity
transformed into self-interested instrumentalism such
that individuals do not collectively decide on political
issues but merely register individual preferences
(105); the political system itself likely gravitates
toward centralization and hierarchy.
While Son arrives at the significance of systems
thinking for understanding transformations to demo-
cratic thought, he largely elides another strain that
emerged at the same time, “open” systems thinking.1
Open systems are embedded within an environment
that permits interaction, change, and consequently
unpredictability. Exchanges with an environment allow
for unforeseen inputs, rendering open systems as
deeply complex and adaptive. Thinking in terms of
open systems, then, brings to fore patterns of self-
organization and decentralized regulation, dynamic or
nonlinear processes, emergent effects wherein the
whole is more than the sum of its parts, and entangled
relationships between organisms and their environ-
ment. Though closed systems thinking was important
in US public administration, a deeper interest in com-
plexity, adaptation, and spontaneity within systems
allowed the minor discourse of open systems thinking
to institutionally emerge in the late 1960s. It is open
systems thinking that concerns the discursive produc-
tion of stakeholders.
At the center of open systems thinking is the problem
of complexity. As von Bertalanffy (1968, 5) makes
evident, the shift toward thinking in terms of systems
arises due to the difficulties of thinking in Newtonian
terms about exceedingly complex phenomena. Systems
thinking, then, is a discourse seeking to understand the
organization of complexity (Heyck 2015, 9), using tech-
niques and forms of explanation that cannot be limited
to efficient causal relations—that is, because of X, we
have Y (Ackoff 1974b, 2). Complexity was not merely
an abstract academic problem but a practical one
organizing social and political life in the middle of the
twentieth century. The complexity of midcentury living
was captured by atomic explosions and the first
glimpses of the Earth from space, integrated circuits
and internetworking, high rates of urbanization and
education reform, racial political activism and decolon-
ization struggles, biological weaponization, and eco-
logical degradation—all of which took place in the
wake of global economic depression and industrialized
genocide. Together these diverse yet entangled pro-
cesses created a sense of unwieldy complexity, a sense
that social change and technological innovation
exceeded human control.
Thus, I argue that (open) systems thinking is a
distinct political rationality forming in the middle of
the twentieth century, one oriented to complexity and
regulative techniques that account for dynamic envir-
onments. To be sure, concepts of complexity and sys-
tems did shape diverse political positions and are
therefore entangled with other political discourses—
namely, neoliberalism. As many have noted (Caldwell
2016; Connolly 2013; Cooper 2011;Walker and Cooper
2011), Friedrich Hayek’s ([1964] 1994) later work
engages with open systems concepts, arguing that com-
plexity evidences the limits of scientific knowledge—
and, by extension, hubristic interventions into the mar-
ket (65). In fact, Hayek has served as a touchstone for
those linking (or delinking) contemporary discourses
around resiliency, systems thinking, and neoliberalism
(Joseph 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011; Zebrowski
2013; cf. D. Chandler 2014), demonstrating that the
genealogies of systems thinking and neoliberalism are
entangled. And yet, while these discursive elements
meet at different historical junctures, I argue that sys-
tems thinking and neoliberalism name different polit-
ical rationalities with distinct problems, forms of
reasoning, ideal techniques, and political subjectivities.
Neoliberalism is notoriously difficult to pin down
(Venugopal 2015), often referring to a set of economic
principles adopted in the US and the UK in the 1980s:
limited government intervention, privatization of pri-
mary industries, open trade, and relatively free/deregu-
latedmarkets (Klein 2014). However, I follow Foucault
and his interlocutors who understand neoliberalism as
an art of government (see Ferguson 2010). As Brown
(2015, 21) argues, neoliberalism not only “names a
historically specific economic and political reaction
against Keynesianism and democratic socialism” but
also refers to “a more general practice of ‘economizing’
spheres and activities heretofore governed by other
tables of value.” Neoliberalism, then, is not simply a
set of economic principles but a broader political—and,
indeed, moral (Brown 2019; Cooper 2017)—project
that seeks to support a competitive market. It is both
an intensification of a classical liberalism marked by
dramatic austerity and a reprogramming of liberalism
wherein the central problem of government is distinct:
whereas liberalism poses clear limits to governmental
practice, specifying that the market must be left alone,
neoliberal governance continually marshals the state to
enable the flourishing of the market. Neoliberalism
does not hold the market as naturally competitive;
rather, the problem of neoliberal governance concerns
1 The distinction between closed and open systems thinking is ana-
lytically useful, though admittedly blurred in practice. As I read it,
Easton’s political systems allow for inputs from an environment but is
interpreted by Son as disposed to centralization/hierarchy based on
the closed systems principles that form the background of Son’s
postwar history (86–90). Son (208, fn. 74–5), however, acknowledges
other more democratic applications of systems science.
























































































































the production and maintenance of competition
(Foucault 2008, 118–29). Further, neoliberalism culti-
vates a specific kind of entrepreneurial subject, one
who continually invests in and takes responsibility for
oneself (Foucault 2008, 241–2). Therefore, the consti-
tutive problems, practices, and forms of subjectivity are
distinct from systems thinking. As I detail below, the
rationality underlying stakeholder inclusion not only
appeared prior to “actually existing” neoliberalism in
the 1980s (Brenner and Theodore 2002) but also did
not concern problems of competitive markets, norma-
tive valuations of individual freedom, or cultivation of
enterprising subjects. Instead, the stakeholder was a
midcentury production, posed as an object and subject
of democratic governance necessary to manage com-
plexity and permit long-term survival of institutions.
SYSTEMSTHINKING,MANAGERIALISM, AND
THE MAKING OF STAKEHOLDERS
The contemporary meaning of stakeholders, as an
affected party or one who has a stake in some problem,
transaction, or process, originated in midcentury busi-
ness managerialism and was made possible by concrete
problems and scientific knowledges. Specifically, it was
complexity and the question of long-term survivability
of the firm that made the identification and participa-
tion of stakeholders a matter of sound managerial
practice (though certainly not one always taken up by
corporations). While the idea of being accountable to
not only shareholders but also stakeholders aligned
with an existing discourse on corporate public respon-
sibility, I maintain that the figure of the stakeholder was
a specific kind of object discursively produced and
disseminated as the firm became defined through the
logic of open systems thinking. That is, once the firm
was no longer conceived as an independent entity but
rendered in open systems terms, as embeddedwithin an
environment and connected to a variety of parties that
may be affected by and therefore could affect corporate
activity, this affected party or stakeholder emerged as
an object of managerial practice. Briefly, open systems
thinking predicated the long-term survival of the firm in
complex and dynamic environments on the identifica-
tion and management of its diverse stakeholders. As a
result, the stakeholder named something different from
“the public” or “society.” Indeed, the stakeholder was
defined in relation to a problem or product, whose
identification and participation in producing outcomes
were required not out of ethical but managerial
concerns.
To be sure, shifts in managerial thinking and prac-
tice did not come from ideas about systems alone but
emerged in the context of heterogeneous material
and discursive processes out of which the problem
of complexity was defined and elaborated for the
corporation. Postwar United States was marked by
the growing size and influence of corporations, which
made them targets of political action. Labor unions,
environmental movements, consumer activism, and
civil rights groups mobilized against US corporations.
Simultaneously, dynamics internal to industry like
corporate mergers, multinational operation, and ten-
sions between owners and management upset institu-
tional stability. The conjunction of these historical
processes constituted the problematic material out
of which systems thinking defined the problem of
complexity for corporate management and posed
new objects and practices for how to properly man-
age the firm. As corporations became sizable institu-
tions, as their products diversified through mergers
and acquisitions, multiple questions arose concerning
how to manage diverse activities and allow these
institutions to survive over the long term (March
and Simon 1958, 4). As corporations grew and share-
holders diversified, the distinction between owner-
ship and management grew stark, with owners
seeking immediate returns on investment and man-
agers seeking to maintain the organization’s viability
in the future (see Chandler 1977). The split between
owners and management (or, crudely, short-term
profitability versus long-term survivability) further
manifested as fissures in preferred managerial tech-
niques—rational efficiency, on the one hand, and
long-term desires for flexibility, on the other (Smith
2008, 36). Whereas efficiency and rigidity benefitted
short-term profits, to survive in the long-term, firms
had to adopt more flexible and open understandings
of corporate activity (50). Systems thinking, liaising
with these material shifts, provided new models of
managing the corporation (cf. Boltanski and Chia-
pello 2007) that pushed against older ones focused on
hierarchical control of capital for the generation of
short-term profits—that is, scientific management
(Taylor 2012, 9–11). It instead emphasized adaptive
practices of long-term survival under conditions of
complexity (Smith 2008, 48).
In what ways could the firm simultaneously adapt to
andmanage this dynamic environment? Systems think-
ing premised organizational survival on accounting for
the multiple affected parties or stakeholders that influ-
enced its activities (Freeman 1984, 32). The interests of
workers and customers, contractors and competitors,
government agencies and environmental lobbyists—or
all who had a stake in the actions of the company—had
to be systematically identified and regulated for a firm
to succeed. Many systems managerial theorists
(Churchman 1968; Emery and Trist 1965) articulated
the stakeholder as a primary and novel site of corporate
action, but Russell Ackoff’s (1970; 1974a; 1974b) work
is illustrative. For Ackoff (1970, 2), it was the problem
of complexity that required new management systems
such that the very concept of corporate planning was
rendered in terms of a “system of decisions.” Ackoff
argued against analyticism, the breaking down of cor-
porate planning into independent subsets (2). Instead,
successful planning saw decisions in each stage as inter-
related—that is, each stage was constitutive of an adap-
tive planning system that responded to its environment.
To be sure, social responsibility was important, as Ack-
off’s (1974a, 56) version of systems thinking necessi-
tated that component parts take “responsibility for the

























































































































theories connected with discussions around business
ethics and social responsibility, but his defense of pos-
ing the firm on such grounds depended upon rethinking
the purpose of profit maximization. According to Ack-
off (1974b, 15–6), “the objective of the corporation
should be stated in terms of what profit can be used
for,” and its use depended on the interactions of cor-
porate activities with different internal and external
“stakeholders.” The modern firm, Ackoff argues, inter-
acts with many “participants”—employees, customers,
suppliers, investors, debtors, the public—and “these
exchanges involve both individuals who are part of
the corporation and other individuals and organiza-
tions that are part of its environment. These partici-
pants in corporate affairs have come to be known as
stakeholders” (16). Thus, long-term survival and inter-
ests of the corporation would be served by benefitting
their environment because in an age of systems, such
flexible and inclusive adaptations to environmental
elements were necessary.
Managerial techniques and practices oriented
toward “stakeholders” was not an academic exercise
but represented a minority discourse across corporate
board rooms, think tanks, and academia. In fact,
according to R. Edward Freeman’s (1984, 32–3) oft-
cited history of the term, the earliest statements naming
“stakeholders” as affected parties upon which a cor-
poration depends came in the early 1960s at the Stan-
ford Research Institute (SRI). Stakeholder theory,
Freeman et al. (2010, 46) tell us, became “gospel” at
SRI, developed in internal meetings of the Theory and
Practice of Planning committee and then circulated in
internal memos, academic articles, and external
reports. SRI’s own historical ledger credits Robert
Stewart with coining the term. Stewart, who worked
at Lockheed alongside famed strategic management
theorist, Igor Ansoff, developed a model of corporate
planning (“SRI System of Plans”) in the Theory and
Practice of Planning committee in which stakeholder
analysis figured as central. This system of corporate
planning was widely disseminated to executives across
the globe between 1965 and 1971.
J. Douglas McConnell (1971), a market economist
at SRI, provides a glimpse of SRI’s institutional think-
ing on corporate planning that evidences how com-
plexity and the logic of systems thinking made the
stakeholder a novel target of managerial practice.
“In today’s large complex organization,” McConnell
argued, “the planning process has to be formalized”
(2). The first step in the methodology of planning—
what SRI called “organized entrepreneurship”—was
to understand the objectives of a firm, the “complex”
unfolding of whichmust “take into account the expect-
ations of the several stakeholder groups, the corporate
skills and resources, and environmental change” (3).
McConnell defined “stakeholder analysis” as the
appropriate tool for developing the “hierarchy of
objectives” for corporations, a tool that involved ana-
lyzing how the different constituencies may affect a
firm, including “stockholders, employees, manage-
ment, functional groups or divisions, customers, dis-
tributors, suppliers, financial institutions, and the
communities in which it operates” (3). Strategic plan-
ning, then, had to assess internal skills and competen-
cies as well as environmental factors, or the “physical,
economic, social, political and technical” context in
which the firm was situated (5).
The importance of scientific knowledge in articulat-
ing the stakeholder is not to dismiss the very real
conditions and social pressures that pushed for corpor-
ate responsibility, but the production of the stakeholder
and other seemingly “democratic” impulses in the
corporate world cannot be reduced to a placating
response to social mobilization. Rather, it represents
an epistemological rethinking of the corporation, its
purposes, and its prospects for survival. Whereas some
notion of corporate accountability to “the public” has
currents going back to the first decades of the twentieth
century, it is the rationality of systems thinking that
defines the “stakeholder” as a managerial object dis-
tinct from the public or society in general. Whereas
public accountability creates a direct and simple rela-
tionship between two things (the firm and a bounded
community), stakeholder management differentiates
the external environment of the corporation into mul-
tiple groups that are positioned in differential relation-
ships. Redefining the public into groups of affected
parties alongside others such as employees, share-
holders, and customers both deterritorializes corporate
activity and establishes inequality among affected
groups. In other words, corporations are not respon-
sible to a clearly demarked citizenry but only to those
parties that emerge in relation to its actions and behav-
iors, and the importance of these groups depend on the
extent to which they can disrupt or otherwise affect the
firm. The shift from “the public” or “citizens” to
“stakeholders” marks an important transformation of




As systems thinking emerged in midcentury corporate
managerialism, this concern with complexity was sim-
ultaneously translated within areas ofUS public admin-
istration. Due to Cold War competition, the federal
government became involved in educational and
technological policy, and open systems thinking
emerged as the political rationality by which “the
stakeholder” was posed alongside the citizen as the
subject of democratic governance. Though democratic
theory and practice have long been suspicious of the
intelligent capacities of the public (Rancière 2014), the
midcentury problem of complexity renewed questions
about the “omnicompetent” citizen. In the context of
rapid change and deep complexity, government offi-
cials, pundits, scholars, and others asked whether the
average citizen in a democracy could intelligently man-
age problems ranging from the nuclear arms race to
urban development (see Amadae 2003; Heyck 2015).
Limiting democratic engagement to only those who
were affected by specific policies allowed for a
























































































































circumscribed participatory mechanism to be advanced
—one based on stakeholder expertise—while effect-
ively sidelining accountability to the broader public and
eroding the basis for collective decision making.
Educational Experiments: Race, Social
Welfare, and Stakeholders
The stakeholder emerges in the 1960s and 1970s in
relatively novel fields of federal government interven-
tion: education and technology. Though seemingly dis-
parate, these policy areas were interrelated given the
context of ColdWar competition. Historically, primary
and secondary education in theUSwas a localmatter to
be determined by municipalities and states, but after
the launch of Sputnik, education became linked to
federal governance of technology and national security.
The National Defense Education Act (NDEA), passed
in 1958, authorized millions for science and mathemat-
ics education, language and area studies, student loan
provisions, grants to secondary institutions, graduate
fellowships, and vocational training in technical indus-
tries (Urban 2010, 2–4). Legislative debate on the
NDEA, as Barbara Clowse (1981) documents, was
organized around whether the US could compete with
the Soviets. At the same time, education became a
primary site in the struggle for racial equality. The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People’s (NAACP) work in challenging white suprem-
acy and racial segregation resulted in the 1954 land-
mark decision, Brown v. Board of Education, which
coupled with the NDEA opened the way for federal
intervention in schooling. Thus, national security, civil
rights activism, and social welfare were linked by the
1960s.
Federal interventions in education did not take the
model of universal welfare but targeted programs dir-
ected at reducing inequality among socioeconomic
groups. The Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (ESEA) of 1965 established a strong federal role
for basic education, targeting disadvantaged lower
income and minority groups through programs like
Head Start and Follow Through. The ESEA, like other
Great Society initiatives, was predicated on closing
racial and socioeconomic disparities through differen-
tial interventions. Because their success required a
reduction in social stratification, a class of expert evalu-
ators was needed to assess the effectiveness of social
policy, one that could help design, monitor, evaluate,
and improve these programs. Thus, the rise of the
welfare state created a need for experts, a situation
that helped establish a science of program evaluation
(Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2003, 12–4). Such moni-
toring and evaluation were contracted out to private
research firms, such as SRI, which drew upon the logic
of systems thinking to make sense of targeted policy
interventions.
Indeed, it was through SRI’s research papers on
educational programs that the articulation of stake-
holders, as opposed to citizens or other democratic
constituencies, first appears in government documents.
Initial introductions are found in reports developed by
SRI’s Educational Policy Research Center in its evalu-
ation of urban school programs and minority education
initiatives. As early as 1967, stakeholder analysis was
proposed as an integral tool for the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), with SRI
arguing that accounting for stakeholders was the best
means to produce policy more responsive to and less
likely to incur resistance from different social groups
(Thomas 1967, 6). Underlying the need for stakeholder
inclusion was systems thinking. In the report for the
Office of Education, SRI foregrounds stakeholder ana-
lysis in developing educational policy geared toward
“the poor minority child who lives in the inner city” (1).
Stakeholder analysis supports effective policy imple-
mentation by not only assessing how goals are met but
also accounting for individual effects that a policy will
have on different parties (4). Because “[f]ew, if any,
programs for education in the inner city will be singular
and discrete” (16), SRI maintains that educational
policy should always be situated among broader social
goals, and as such the “noneducational” effects of
policy must also be considered. In recognition of racial
divisions and civil rights activism, SRI outlines the
import of governing through stakeholders.
The concept of “stakeholder,” borrowed from SRI’s work
in corporate planning, may be useful in this regard. A
stakeholder is any individual or group who has a stake in,
that is, will be affected by, the outcome of a particular
decision. Every group within the society is a potential
stakeholder depending upon the issue. Educational deci-
sions intended to affect the skills, attitudes, or values
which students acquire in formal education make stake-
holders of nearly everyone for the decisions affect the
future of society. (16)
The report goes on to specify the temporality of stake-
holder practices, noting that as “an organization
evolves and the environment changes,” the interests
and goals of stakeholders will also change (19).
Grounded in systems thinking, SRI argues for the
importance of engaging stakeholders continually as
environmental influences shift the priorities of affected
parties and the organization.
The racialization of education policy was explicit in
SRI’s analysis of urban education, both in defining the
contours of specific problems and positioning stake-
holder identification as necessary to solve them. A
report on improving urban educational facilities begins
by noting how the “rapid influx of poorminority groups
has compounded” preexisting problems with school
infrastructure while creating overcrowded classrooms
(Thomas 1969, 1). To study the problem, SRI poses a
methodology between an “in-depth technical study and
a general systems approach,” finding the latter’s focus
on quantitative inputs insufficient (2). Though not
specifically naming an “open” systems approach, the
report is premised on understanding school systems as
“in a precarious relationship with their environment
(parent, civil rights groups, black militants, teachers’
unions, and students)” (2). Proposals for expanding

























































































































affect diverse constituents such that SRI must parse
“negative” stakeholders, only interested in constrain-
ing change, and those that seek “positive” control such
as “white liberals,” “black militants,” and “the
teachers” (4). Through consultation and dialogue with
these groups, SRI outlines how specific proposals such
as educational parks and mini-schools meet or fail to
meet the expectations of primary stakeholders, using
consensus positions to frame their interests. Such inter-
ests, to be clear, are not limited to registering individual
preferences but take on a deeper recognition of polit-
ical claims, such as liberal desires for integration and
“Black militant” desires for disrupting institutional
racism (8). Indeed, SRI advances the somewhat radical
proposal of community-controlled schools, though they
caution that what is to be taken away from the report is
not the policy recommendation, per se, but an under-
standing of how to recognize and work with the “driv-
ing forces” that exist in each policy context (125)—that
is, stakeholder analysis is itself the recommendation.
The focus on governing stakeholders to manage
complex policy interventions and dynamic environ-
ments continues in subsequent SRI documents (e.g.,
Thomas and Harman 1972). In a two-volume report on
Knowledge Production and Utilization (KPU) in edu-
cation policy, the political rationality of systems think-
ing as that which governs through the subject of
stakeholders is explicit (Markley 1975a). The 1975
report examines a “systems mapping approach” to
assess and monitor initiatives for the National Institute
of Education (xxi). SRI predicates their work on his-
torical changes in federal research and development in
education, noting that the ESEA permitted greater
interest in the production of knowledge and its use
within school systems (2–3). Critical in this moment,
the report argues, was the influence of systems analysis
at the DoD, which influenced the conceptualization of
education R&D as “a system with nested subsystems”
(3). But contrary to the closed systems principles found
at theDoD, the report pushes for open or living systems
approaches, emphasizing self-organization, adaptation,
co-evolution, and environmental interaction (166–7).
In the second volume of the report, SRI applies their
framework to several case studies, where the report’s
conclusions make the reasoning for stakeholder inclu-
sion legible through the logic of open systems thinking.
One of the systems principles that seems to occur through-
out all hierarchically organized systems, whether they are
“mechanical” or “living,” is the phenomenon of “hierarch-
ical emergence.” This is the phenomenon through which a
new coherent system property “emerges”when a series of
lower order systems or configurations begins to work in
close interaction over time, so that the new higher level
configuration or system can have stable properties of its
own… . As is true in all living systems, however, the
survival probability of a mutant organism or species is
small unless the mutant has, by virtue of its mutation, a
superior advantage in its life-support transactions with the
ecological networks surrounding it. This principle, trans-
lated relative to KPU, means that NIE as an institution
and KPU as a concept must always have “currency”
(legitimacy and value) to the principal stakeholders in
the KPU community. Only then can KPU guarantee its
survival in the “jungle” through which its allocations
policy is formed. (Markley 1975b, 48–9)
Thus, the report recommends the “need for strong
political support from the community having vested
interests in effective KPU in education” (49).
To be sure, while SRI educational policy reports
delivered to HEW are central to this story, other
documents push against ascribing causal agency to
any one actor. Rather, there were multiple places in
which the language of stakeholders came to informUS
public administration. As early as 1970, Adolph Koe-
nig of the American Educational Research Associ-
ation delivered a paper on the management of
educational research in the United States. Discussing
the possibility of a National Institute of Education to
coordinate research into educational policy under
HEW, Keonig (1970, 14) emphasized that “the insti-
tute’s strength will come from awell-developed policy,
planning and priority setting machinery involving rep-
resentation from the several communities and groups
of stakeholders concerned with the health of
education.” Organizing the planning process will
require the institute to “bring modern management
technologies to bear on the problems of resource
allocation for research, development, and adoption”
(15). Indeed, it is the rationality of systems thinking
that makes corporate managerial models and tech-
niques desired:
Differentiation of function and mechanisms for planning,
coordinating, priority setting and decision-making are key
elements in systems to articulate knowledge into practice.
Linked systems of differentiated capacities which bring to
bear critical masses of resources and deal with real prob-
lems are a necessity and will require improved manage-
ment… . Indeed, the concepts underlying techniques such
as a management of objectives, contingency management,
convergence and Delphi techniques, strategic planning
and a host of lables [sic] associated with evaluation and
supporting operations research activities will become
more familiar. (11–2)
Notably, though Koenig’s paper calls for stakeholder
inclusion to organize systems of education manage-
ment, there is no reference or citation to SRI. Thus,
the language of stakeholder inclusion was increasingly
becoming naturalized in a variety of educational insti-
tutional assessments (e.g., Garman and Hunter 1978;
Hood and Blackwell 1975; McClure 1977). By the late
1970s, summative reports on “Multiple Stakeholders
andEvaluation” in education policy were reviewing the
state of the art of governing through stakeholders
(Eichelberger 1978).
In midcentury educational policy, then, the stake-
holder began to stand in for the citizen or the public as
that to which government programs must identify and
respond. However, institutional discourse was primar-
ily concerned with producing the stakeholder as an
object of governmental practice. In the next section, I
present the process by which the stakeholder was
























































































































explicitly articulated as a novel kind of democratic
subject distinct from and superior to the citizen.
Technological Progress against the
Omnicompetent Citizen
As with education policy, Cold War competition
shaped discussions on technological innovation. But
while technological progress became part of national
security, environmental movements, community resist-
ance to nuclear power, and consumer rights groups
questioned the unintended and unaccounted effects
of rapid technological change. It was from within this
problematic context that the stakeholder was posed as
the proper subject of democratically governing com-
plex issues. The Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA), established in 1972, was tasked with regulating
and evaluating the generation and proliferation of new
technologies in a way that was socially beneficial, but
the complexities of governing technology posed prob-
lems for democracy itself. If governing technology was
necessarily complex, requiring specialized expertise
from different sectors and disciplines, how should dif-
ferent constituencies be involved in developing and
implementing regulations? Who should be recognized
and included? How could these complex proceedings
be made publicly legible? As Edward Kennedy, Chair
of the Board of the OTA made clear, the agency was
“not only an experiment in technical analysis” and
“institutional reform” but also democratic governance
(OTA 1975, 60). The OTAwas needed for Congress to
“cope with complex technical issues” and be a source
for “unbiased technical expertise,” but Kennedy noted,
[i]t is not just a matter of whether Congress can utilize
technical information and advice. The crucial point is
whether Congress can do so in the full glare of public
scrutiny—and with the full participation of the varied
public groups that have a stake in the outcome of the
decisions. Thus, the Advisory Committees we have estab-
lished contain not only the technical experts, and the
economists, lawyers, and sociologists—but also the repre-
sentatives of labor and industry, consumers, environmen-
talists, and other interested segments of the public. (60)
Seeking the “full participation of the varied public
groups that have a stake in the outcome of the
decisions” and creating advisory committees made up
of “interested segments of the public” specify the
stakeholder rather than an individual citizen or the
public as the subject of democracy. It is not the citizenry
that concernedKennedy but only those who had skin in
the game, who had “a stake in the outcome.” Like the
changes in educational policy outlined above, what
made this shift possible was the political rationality of
systems thinking responding to material problems of
complexity.
Technology assessment, according to initial OTA
proceedings, was needed because technological change
was outpacing the ability of individuals to manage
unintended effects (US House of Representatives
1967) and the “growing complexity of society” was
connecting numerous, seemingly distant social elem-
ents in surprising ways (Coates 1971, 226). Thus, con-
cern over rapid social and technological changes
required new techniques to anticipate and mitigate
potentially negative effects (Arnstein 1977, 572–3).
These techniques—indeed, the whole field of technol-
ogy assessment—was based on systems thinking. As
Emilio Daddario defined it in early Congressional
statements pushing for the creation of the OTA, tech-
nology assessment was “a system to ask the right
questions and obtain correct and timely answers” about
future consequences (quoted in Hahn and Chalk 1972,
CRS-16). Even as Joseph Coates (1976, 140), Assistant
to the Director of the OTA in the 1970s, asserted that
there was “no methodology, no algorithm nor para-
digm, which will define or yield a technology
assessment,” he nevertheless organized the definable
elements and useful models of technology assessment
through the logic of systems. In 1976, Coates outlined
10 elements of the technique that began with examin-
ation of “problems statements” and shifted to various
steps, including the specification of “system
alternatives” and “macro system alternatives” (140).
According to Coates, defining systems was “a key part
of a technology assessment, inasmuch as that is the only
way to define a useful range of systems alternatives to
be studied” (141). Moreover, the suggested models for
technology assessment included “system dynamic
modelling,” developed by the systems theorist, Jay
Forrester, environmental models known as Strategic
EnvironmentalAssessment Systems (SEAS), and scen-
ario planning.
In reflecting on how to govern technology, the stake-
holder appeared as the kind of political subject neces-
sary to deal with complexity while “saving” democratic
participation. Walter Hahn (1975), a staffer from the
Congressional Research Service, cast it in explicit
terms:
The advent of technology assessment raises some unique
and as yet unanswerable questions about “participation.”
Technology assessment is a highly sophisticated process
involving expertise in a variety of advanced and complex
analytical techniques… . Not only are there complex
interactions among these experts, but between them and
those who must make the decisions. Some have charac-
terized these interactions as those between the practi-
tioners and those in the power structure and between
experts and, relatively speaking, laymen. But there is a
third party to the technology assessment process, the
affected party… . This “stakeholder” is a primary party
favoring an outcome in his specific interests. (77)
The question of democratic participation emerged
early in the making of the OTA. It was clear that
“expert” knowledge was needed but the prospects of
veering into technocracy prompted questions about
whom among the public should be able to participate.
In fact, according to a review of legislation leading to
the creation of the OTA, a Congressional Research

























































































































of public participation in technology assessment was to
its making. But, the “public” was not an assembly of
equal citizens but differentiated into “affected parties,
highly organized groups, diffuse interests, and apath-
etic members” (Congressional Research Service N.d.,
CRS-2).
This shift from the public to affected parties or
interests (i.e., stakeholders) was shaped by court deci-
sions on the environment, wherein the “affected party”
became legally recognized (Green 1968). However,
arguments that transformed democratic participation
in terms of stakeholders did not appeal to legal prece-
dent but to managerial techniques. In testimony to the
House Subcommittee on Science, Research and Devel-
opment, for instance, Richard Carpenter, Chair of the
Engineering Foundation Research Conference on
Technology Assessment, set the solution to governing
somewhere between “technocracy” and “chaos,” or
between technocratic leadership and the “full
participation” of citizens (quoted in Congressional
Research Service N.d., CRS-11). “The question,” Car-
penter maintained, “is how to take advantage of the
knowledge necessary to run a big, complex society
without giving up the values of participation. The
answer we’re looking for is a third way” (CRS-11). Carl
Bruch of the Brookings Institution echoed the prob-
lematic premise of managing complexity:
As our society increases in technological complexity, the
price of an error in the risk/benefit equation is constantly
increasing. Because the future destinies of so many people
are affected by any decisions that governmental agencies
make in terms of technology assessment, I feel that there
has to bemore input from the public. Such inputs can come
not only from the highly organized interests but also from
all those affected by any technological decisions so that
our society does have a democratic decision-making pro-
cess at work in such technological evaluations. (CRS-11)
LouisMayo (1969), involved in themaking of theOTA,
also pushed strongly for participatory mechanisms in
technology assessment (91), but public participation
only referred to affected parties. Indeed, for Mayo, a
single “public interest” did not usually exist in complex
situations.
When such elements of uncertainty exist, sharp differences
of opinion inevitably arise since some segments of society
benefit and others suffer.Why shouldwe reasonably expect
that such matters be determined without resort to some
form of adversarial system and the opportunity for affected
participants to state their positions? (57)
As Christopher Wright, a professor at Columbia Uni-
versity, summarized in his 1967 testimony,
On the question of public information … we have now
reached the point where we ought to refine the concepts of
public information by realizing that there are many differ-
ent publics, and that it is no derogation of democracy to
recognize that as a statistical matter there are few occa-
sions on which many members of the total population will
focus on any one issue simultaneously. (Congressional
Research Service N.d., CRS-6)
Confronted with a rapidly changing and complex envir-
onment, formulations of political participation at the
OTA refused the idea that the institution could be used
for arriving at a common good or provide a space in
which interestedanddisinterestedmembers of thepublic
can collectively arrive at decisions. Rather, to manage
complexity through relevant expertise, democratic par-
ticipation took the form of stakeholder inclusion.
STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EROSION OF
DEMOCRACY
A constitutive problem for midcentury governance in
concrete spaces of public administration was how to
manage complexity in a democratic polity, how to
maintain a sense of accountability and participation in
the presumed absence of an informed and intelligent
public. Democratic governance refused the possibility
of wider public discussion on and solutions to complex
problems, limiting participation to those who had a
stake in the specific issue. The political rationality of
systems thinking, I argue, underpinned such institu-
tional solutions and articulated the stakeholder as a
novel subject.
How, then, does the emergence of stakeholders in
democratic practice limit engagement and participa-
tion? How do increased opportunities for political
participation correlate with democratic detachment?
Few political theorists hold systems thinking and man-
agerialism as culpable for democratic detachment, save
for notable exceptions. Mark Bevir (2006, 427), for
instance, discusses “systems governance,” along with
its emphasis on stakeholder inclusion, as an elitist
project rather than something radically democratic.
Bevir, thus, holds social scientific discourses on new
institutionalism and communitarianism as culpable
(427), arguing that stakeholder inclusion is about elites
soliciting buy-in rather than open processes of collect-
ive decision making (432–4). Sheldon Wolin (2008,
135), on the other hand, tracks managerial influences
in democratic practice to the postwar era, arguing that
such influence in government has had a corrupting
effect on public institutions as well as the public inter-
est. The figure of the manager,Wolin contends (222), is
central to the elitist project of “managed democracy,”
which dampens political participation and undermines
commitments to political equality and the
common good.
Treading the same historical ground as Wolin, Son
(2020, 68–9) deftly pushes against accounts that ren-
der the problem of democracy as a symptom of
elitism. For Son, it is less important that participation
has been suppressed than the very concept of partici-
pation has been redefined in terms of individual
instrumentalism. “Postwar democratic theory,” Son
(176) makes clear, “does not simply narrow the scope
of political participation but alters its terms and
























































































































changes the environment in which it takes place.”
Rather than collective cooperation, inquiry, and deci-
sion making, rather than coming together to decide on
the common good, democratic participation under
systems science becomes “an instrument that individ-
uals use only to pursue their private interests” (176).
Thus, the problem of democracy is not a turn to
elitism and the suppression of participation (177),
per se, but the reframing of participation as a mech-
anism to realize one’s own self-interest.
By focusing on the set of discourses and material
practices that articulate the stakeholder as a subject of
democratic governance, by engaging with the political
rationality underpinning concrete programs of govern-
ment, my genealogy arrives at conclusions that reson-
ate with but also push against this literature. Despite its
participatory and deliberative character, I argue that
the figure of the stakeholder erodes democracy in at
least three ways. First, though the stakeholder or
affected party is a participatory subject, the form of
participation fails to cultivate habits of discovering a
common good. On my view, for democracy to be
meaningful, it cannot be reduced to a thin set of pro-
cedures and institutions that represent the public inter-
est but must involve a deeper commitment to the
experience of political equality (Brown 2019, 24–5).
Such a commitment to political equality is not merely
a guiding principle of institutional order but one that
must present in the everyday experience of engaging
and negotiating with others. Such a pragmatist under-
standing of democracy, as John Dewey ([1939] 2021,
62–4) argues, figures democratic equality as something
that is lived, a continual faith in “human equality” and a
“belief in the ability of human experience to generate
the aims and methods by which further experience will
flow in ordered richness.”When equality is assumed in
the collective process of discovering a common good,
rigid attachments to narrow self-interest or exclusive
visions of the good life loosen and possibilities for
arriving at novel values and practices emerge. Democ-
racy, then, involves what fellow pragmatist Mary
Parker Follett (1930, 56) called “integrative
behavior,” or reflexively discovering those common
values and ways of being that dissolve prior antagon-
isms. Not to be mistaken for compromise, integration
involves the creative production of novelty, one which
shores up a social connective tissue that simultaneously
allows for the expression of oneself and society. Finding
this novel ground requires habits of contest, dialogue,
participation, and even collective inquiry (Abraham
and Abramson 2017) that can identify inequities and
transactionally articulate a revised political order. Inte-
gration encourages individuals and the community to
be transformed through the process of democratic
engagement. To be sure, the arrival of the common
good is neither the prerequisite to democratic action
nor its final end (cf. Schumpeter [1943] 2010, 226–8) but
contingently produced and continually revised (Dewey
[1939] 2021, 64–5).
“Stakeholder democracy,” however, signals a con-
cerning rethinking of democratic engagement and par-
ticipation, distinct from the commitments that guide
democratic theory’s commitments to participation and
action (Barber 1984; Fung and Wright 2003; Pateman
1970; Wolin 2018). Grounded in the logic of systems
thinking, institutional engagement with and participa-
tion from stakeholders are cultivated not to arrive at
the articulation of common values but to manage com-
plexity. Rather than members of the public coming
together to collectively confront different political
visions and transactionally arriving at novel positions,
circumscribed engagement among affected parties is
staged for long-term institutional survival. Participa-
tion, as such, is not severed from political institutions
but, under conditions of complexity, tied to only those
interests that are affected by a problem and channeled
for the perpetuation of political order. For instance,
Coates, a member of a Public Participation Committee
established by Daddario in 1977, developed a frame-
work for stakeholder identification in policy assess-
ments (OTA 1977, 3). According to the meeting
minutes, Coates maintained that the relevant public
here should not be confused “with the laity” but only
those who have a stake in policy (2). Other committee
members agreed, developing stakeholder identification
techniques that if done in a systematic manner would
not only ensure that “many groups would not be
overlooked” but “would also provide a basis for limit-
ing the number of stakeholders if, for some purposes,
that [would be] necessary” (7). The priority, then, is not
an empowered demos but managed participation.
Therefore, like Son’s parsing of postwar democratic
theory, practices oriented around stakeholder inclusion
and participation depend on a kind of instrumentalism.
However, this instrumental attitude is not limited to the
realization of individual interest or results in a “contest
of sovereign wills” (Son 2020, 177). Instead, with stake-
holder subjectivity, individuals may arrive at circum-
scribed forms of collective identification and
collaboration with their stakeholder group. That is,
forms of collective engagement emerge that may not
be predicated on individual self-interest and distribu-
tional gains, but they are, indeed, limited to the stake-
holder group rather than the public. For instance,
stakeholder engagement may permit mobilization of a
community group around environmental impact of a
business or, as in the case of school infrastructure
discussed above, distinct racial and political groups.
But it limits wider forms of engagement—both among
stakeholder groups involved in the policy process and
among those parties not affected by a particular policy
decision and, therefore, excluded. Individual interest
becomes married to that of a specific group at the
expense of negotiating across lines of difference and
transactionally producing novel forms of commonality.
This, I argue, is a more dynamic form of interest group
pluralism, where one’s connection to a group does not
remain static (e.g., identity with “labor”) but shifts
based on affectedness in relation to a problem. Such a
modulated instrumentalism does not reduce democ-
racy to individualism or distributional issues alone
(cf. Son 2020, 65), as it accommodates a politics of
recognition (Fraser 1995; 2000), but neither does it

























































































































own affected circumstances or establish novel ways of
seeing oneself and others.
Second, because “stakeholder democracy” draws
together affected parties, it erases distinctions between
individuals and groups, providing political parity to
qualitatively different actors. Reconfiguring democ-
racy around the subject of stakeholders permits legit-
imate political participation for all affected parties,
leveling the voice of individual citizens with large
multinational corporations. This poses problems for
collective decision making predicated on equality
because it allows for structural inequalities to embed
themselves within institutions. If stakeholder inclusion
requires active participation among affected parties—
that is, to make one’s voice heard, one must participate
in the policy process—capitalism necessarily constrains
equal participation among affected groups. For
instance, if one were to participate as a stakeholder in
the internet governance policy space, where multista-
keholder inclusion is firmly institutionalized and cele-
brated (Carr 2015), an affected individual would have
to find time to do so outside of every day working hours
while telecommunication companies send paid repre-
sentatives, undermining political equality (Marlin‐Ben-
nett 2001).
While corporate influence in democratic governance
is a symptom of broader unexamined factors, genea-
logical attention to the discourses and material circuits
that articulated the stakeholder in public institutions
demonstrates the accidental circumstances by which
corporate actors have come to hold a legitimate role
in solving public problems. Predicating solutions to
complexity on the inclusion of stakeholders initially
emerged as a strategy for corporations to survive in
dynamic environments, but the institutional circuitry
between private research firms and public agencies,
established in the context of postwar social welfare
programs, permitted the movement of these ideas and
practices into US public administration. The political
rationality of systems thinking, then, is necessary to
grasp how corporate voices became understood as
legitimately required to solve complex problems (e.g.,
around climate change, social media, polarization,
etc.). As such, governing through stakeholders not only
provides space for corporate interests to determine
policy that directly affects their business, but it goes
further to name their participation in politics as demo-
cratically legitimate.
Finally, a turn to stakeholders as the subject of
democratic practice amplifies rather than resolves the
problem of expertise. If for Wolin (2008), the problem
of midcentury democracy is an elitism that disables
participation, and if for Son (2020), the problem is
how diminished opportunities for participation are
recast as sites for registering individual preferences
and interests, the problem of “stakeholder democracy”
is different. Here, opportunities to participate prolifer-
ate, but participatory mechanisms involve bringing
different forms of “expert” knowledge to bear on a
political issue. In being directly affected, whether as an
individual or corporation, a network of activists or
scientific body, stakeholders bring their own
experience and knowledge to the table to manage
complex social and political problems. Thus, the prac-
tice of stakeholder inclusion reinscribes elitism through
participation by predicating the latter on the expertise
an affected party holds rather than on the equal cap-
acities of anyone. Rather than a faith in the equality of
all, rather than cultivating political intelligence that can
allow the public to make informed decisions on issues
outside of their individual expertise and concern
(Dewey [1939] 2021, 63), stakeholder democracy limits
participation to those with a kind of expertise formed
by shared affectedness. This necessarily reinforces a
functionalist division of stakeholder groups and limits
the capacity for stakeholders and nonaffected parties to
transactionally discuss the values and principles that
underwrite decisions on the common good. Dissolving
the problem of expertise in a democracy requires habits
of political intelligence that allow for individuals to
understand and negotiate that which they do not know
and that inwhich they have no clear interests (Son 2020,
22–3).
THE PUZZLE OF CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACY: BEYOND A CRITIQUE OF
(NEO)LIBERALISM?
Across multiple institutions, we are increasingly called
upon as stakeholders to make our voices heard, to
participate in political life, and yet there is little inves-
tigation into the category of the stakeholder, where it
comes from, and its effects on democracy. My wager in
this paper is that in historically mapping the political
reasoning that articulates the stakeholder, in under-
standing the managerial logic that underpins it, I can
clarify howmidcentury transformations have produced
a novel political subjectivity that orients democratic
practice and sets limits to participatory politics. While
I do not maintain that themaking of stakeholders in the
1960s and 1970s can be linearly drawn to the present,
that the political rationality of systems thinking is the
discursive register from which transformations in
democratic governance have proceeded, this genealogy
recovers how managerialism, systems thinking, and
problems of complexity constitute part of the story of
democratic erosion.
Attending to the stakeholder brings to fore new ways
of understanding the crisis of democracy that contributes
to prominent debates on the relationship between (neo)
liberalism and democracy. There is a deep literature that
focuses on the problematic effects of neoliberalism on
democracy (Brown 2015; 2019; Cahill andKonings 2017;
Cooper 2017; Crouch 2004; Ong 2006; Peck 2010; Slo-
bodian 2018; Streeck 2014; Vormann and Lammert
2019), which typically figures neoliberal policies and
discourses as undermining political equality or otherwise
dampening democratic engagement. Others, however,
argue that democratic erosion is not symptomatic of
neoliberalism, per se, but emerges from the contradic-
tions of liberal democracy. Whether from feminist
(Jaggar 1983; Pateman 1985; 1988), Black radical
(Mills 2008), agonistic (Honig 1993; Laclau and Mouffe
























































































































2001), postcolonial (Mehta 1990), polemical (Chambers
2013), or Tocquevillian (Deneen 2018) positions, this
literature considers how liberalism tempers, dismisses,
or remains logically incompatible with democracy. As
Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo (2008; 2017) cautions, the
rise of neoliberalism in the last part of the twentieth
century does not mark a distinct break from the histor-
ical formation of liberal democracy; rather, it flourishes
through the liberal institutions that depoliticize society
and, consequently, undermine democratic action and
participation. Annie McClanahan (2017) echoes this
position, casting doubt on the novelty of neoliberal
effects, such as the economization of nonmarket spheres
of life, by locating practices and policies that economized
higher education following the end of WWII.
Limited space precludes proper engagement with
the diversity of positions that exist in this literature,
but two assumptions tend to inform these critiques: an
attention to “world-altering formations” (Brown
2019, 17)—that is, liberalism and neoliberalism—and
a sense that what will energize democratic attachment
is political participation. My argument does not dis-
place these rich accounts, but it maintains that a
singular focus on the depoliticizing effects of (neo)
liberalism misses part of the story. Without under-
standing how the political rationality of systems think-
ing has produced democratic subjectivity, without
assessing how stakeholder participation limits wider
engagement, we fail to grasp how democratic detach-
ment persists despite opportunities for political par-
ticipation. Prior to the rise of neoliberalism in the
1980s and running alongside the liberal pluralism of
the postwar era, political subjectivity was shaped by
the managerial logic of systems thinking wherein cir-
cumscribed participation figured as managerial tech-
niques to deal with problems of complexity. Rather
than allowing for deep pluralization and democratic
revision of collective attachments, rather than resolv-
ing the problem of expertise by cultivating habits of
political intelligence that allow for collective decision
making, stakeholder democracy limits substantive
participation. That systems thinking, problems of
complexity, and neoliberal discourses meet today is
all the more reason to understand the contingent
connection and “interplay” of distinct rationalities
(Foucault 2008, 313). Therefore, my contribution to
these debates is neither to logically question nor
empirically doubt the critiques of (neo)liberalism but
to offer a genealogical account of that which has been
elided: how we became stakeholders.
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